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securities, regardless of other facts and circumstances, this pro-
vision also constitutes an exempt transaction. However, let it
be remembered that all the exemptions heretofore referred to
are exemptions from the registration and/or prospectus require-
ments of Section 5. By reason of the Securities Act, it is now
the law that even if a registration statement is in effect as to a
security, or even if the security is exempt under Section 3 of the
Act and the transaction in which it figures is also exempt under
Section 4 of the Act, one may still be liable for fraud in the sale
of the security under Sections 12 and 17 and this for the first
time under Federal Statute. From Sections 12 and 17 there are
no exemptions.
BERNAM SUSM1AN.
STATUTORY DAMAGES FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Legislatures and courts have long been baffled by the problem
of proper redress for infringement of copyright.1 The Constitu-
tion grants exclusive power in the copyright field to Congress. 2
Pursuant to this provision statutes have been enacted which
govern the various phases of copyright regulation and practice, s
inter alia, the matter of remedies in cases of infringement.4
Equity, with5 or without" statutory authorization, however, will
enjoin infringement of a copyright. Recovery may be had of a
money judgment, measured by profits which have accrued to the
offendor,7 damage sustained by the copyright owner,8 and lost
1. See generally Caplan, The Measure of Recovery in Actions for In-
fringement of Copyright (1939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 564; Lerner, Copyright
Law and Its Santions (1938) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 523; Solberg, Copyright
Law Reform (1925) 35 Yale L. J. 48; Solberg, The Present Copyright Situa-
tion (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 184.
2. U. S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8: "The Congress shall have power * * *
To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writ-
ings and discoveries."
3. (1927) 17 U. S. C. A. sees. 1-62.
4. (1909) 35 Stat. 1031, (1912) 37 Stat. 489, (1927) 17 U. S. C. A. sec.
25, hereinafter cited as 17 U. S. C. A. see. 25.
5. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 25 (a); Admur, Copyright Law and Practice (1936)
1170; Copinger, Law of Copyright (6th ed. 1927) 167 et seq.
6. Wilkens v. Aiken (Ch. 1810) 17 Ves. 422, 34 Eng. Rep. 163; Lawrence
v. Smith (Ch. 1827) Jacob 473, 37 Eng. Rep. 928; Spottiswoode v. Clark(Ch. 1846) Coop. T. Cott. 254, 47 Eng. Rep. 844; Pierpont v. Fowler (C. C.
D. Mass. 1846) 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,152; West Publishing Co. v. Thompson(C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1909) 169 Fed. 883.
7. Statutory provision is found in 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 25 (b). See also
Admur, Copyright Law and Practice (1936) 1112; Caplan, The Measure
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sales., The law on these points is simple and clear; the main
problem is that of proof. It is almost unchallenged that provable
actual damages frequently fail properly to compensate for the
violation of a copyright, because of the intangible nature of the
interest so protected and the difficulty involved in presenting to
the court an accounting which reflects the real injury inflicted
on the aggrieved owner.10 A determination of what might have
been gained had the copyright not been infringed is nebulous
indeed. The damages question in the field of unfair competition
is rather closely analogous." There is a need for compensation
over and above the arithmetically provable damages. Congress,
taking cognizance of this difficulty, has incorporated into the
present statute a mode of coping with it. The statute empowers
the court to impose liability on the infringer
To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the
copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringe-
ment, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have
made from such infringement, * * * or in lieu of actual
damages and profits such damages as to the court shall ap-
pear just, and in assessing such damages the court may, in
its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter stated, * * *
Fourth. In the case of a dramatic or dramatic-musical or
a choral or orchestral composition, $100 for the first and $50
for every subsequent infringing performance; in the case
of other musical compositions $10 for every infringing per-
formance. 1'2
of Recovery in Actions for Infringement of Copyright (1939) 37 Mich. L.
Rev. 564; Note (1934) 9 Temp. L. Q. 278. As to the non-statutory right
to such recovery see Stevens v. Gladding (U. S. 1855) 17 How. 447;
Copinger, Law of Copyright (6th ed. 1927) 170.
8. Stevens v. Gladding (U. S. 1855) 17 How. 447; Belford v. Scribner
(1892) 144 U. S. 488; Stevens v. Cady (C. C. D. R. I. 1854) 23 Fed. Cas.
No. 18,395; Blank v. Manufacturing Co. (C. C. D. Del. 1856) 3 Fed. Cas.
No. 1532; Sanborn Map & Pub. Co. v. Daken Pub. Co. (C. C. N. D. 1889)
39 Fed. 266; Falk v. Gast Lithograph & Engraving Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1893)
54 Fed. 890; Ginn & Co. v. Apollo Pub. Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1915) 228
Fed. 214; McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp. (C. C. A. 5, 1924) 299 Fed. 48;
Admur, Copyright Law and Practice (1936) 1111; Copinger, Law of Copy-
right (6th ed. 1927) 169; Paramore v. Mack Sennett, Inc. (D. C. S. D.
Cal. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 66.
9. Admur, Copyright Law and Practice (1936) 1115; Johnson, Pecuniary
Liability of an Infringer of Statutory Copyright to the Copyright Owner
(1938) 4 John Marshall L. Q. 40.
10. Brady v. Daly (1899) 175 U. S. 148; Lerner, Copyright Law and Its
Sanctions (1938) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 523; Caplan, The Measure of Re-
covery in Actions for the Infringement of Copyright (1939) 37 Mich. L.
Rev. 564.
11. See Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade Marks (3d ed. 1936) 1047
et seq.
12. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 25 (b).
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The matter of statutory damages has constituted one of the
storm centers of copyright litigation generally, and particularly
in connection with musical compositions.18 Its historical develop-
ment illustrates a colorful economic struggle in which the de-
mands of competing pressure groups are clearly revealed. 14 Oper-
ators and owners of taverns, amusement centers, radio stations,
and similar enterprises advocate the assessment of actual prov-
able damages only.1 5 The creative "artists" maintain that justice
demands, as the statute now provides, the payment of a rather
substantial sum even where actual damages can not be shown-
a contention based on the intangible nature of copyrights, 0 the
incalculable injury which is inflicted on the owner of an infringed
copyright," and the manner in which the composers and authors
have organized. These groups have united to form the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers,1 8 to which indi-
viduals assign the right to perform their works publicly for
profit; the Society then issues licenses embracing the rights to
perform any of the numerous compositions in the A. S. C. A. P.
Catalogue. The practical impossibility of tracing the precise
damages resulting from the infringement of any one of the copy-
rights therein listed is urged by the A. S. C. A. P. as demon-
strating the need for a statutory weapon such as the one set out
above. The composers, then, have prevailed upon Congress to
establish a statutory minimum allowance.
Problems of some complexity have arisen under the quoted
statutory provision. An attempt will here be made to indicate
and to evaluate the solutions worked out by the courts and to
ascertain whether the present law adequately safeguards the in-
terests at stake.19
ELECTION OF REMEDIES
Where alternative remedies are provided by statute, it is al-
most inevitable that problems as to election should arise. The
13. Lerner, Copyright Law and Its Sanctions (1938) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev.
523; Johnson, Pecuniary Liability of an Infringer of Statutory Copyright
to the Copyright Owner (1938) 4 John Marshall L. Q. 40.
14. Lerner, supra, note 13.
15. Caplan, The Measure of Recovery in Actions for the Infringement of
Copyright (1939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 564; Pforzheimer, Copyright Reform and
the Duffy Bill (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 433.
16. Lerner, supra, note 13; Caplan, supra, note 15; Pforzheimer, supra,
note 15.
17. See authorities cited supra, note 10.
18. See Lerner, supra, note 13.
19. The very involvement of the damages issue in the cases to be dis-
cussed is indicative of the existence of a valid copyright and of the fact
of infringement; these issues, therefore, will be presupposed.
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NOTES
repudiated case of Woodward v. Lydiard-Peterson Co.2 0 may be
cited for the rigorous view that the statutory damage provision-'
applies only in instances where substantial damage is indicated
but the evidence is incomplete or insufficient for an intelligent
determination thereof. The court there maintained that where
actual damages are ascertainable, the case is automatically elimi-
nated from consideration under the "in lieu" clause. The line of
decisions following this case stands for the proposition that the
introduction of evidence of actual damage compels an award on
the merits of the case rather than on the basis of the "in lieu"
clause.
The foundation for the liberal and usual rule was laid in
the Westerman22 and No-Leak-O-Piston Ring23 cases where it
was held that the compensation to which the injured owner is
entitled rests entirely in the discretion of the trial judge who is
to award what he deems just, employing as his criteria the sub-
ject of the copyright, the circumstances of the infringement, and
his own concept of which type fits the particular case. It is sub-
mitted that this rule more adequately meets the need for an
effective remedy in copyright cases where a wrong is shown but
precise damages are not. It has been held that the.complainant
may not make an election which is absolutely binding on the
court .2 ' The preferable practice, then, is one which permits the
trial court to allow either actual or statutory damages as de-
manded by the exigencies of the case at hand. The grant of this
broad discretion to the trial judge follows naturally from the
fact that one of the purposes of enacting the present statute was
the avoidance of the strict construction which would attach if
the law were penal.25
Hereinafter, discussion will be centered around problems in-
volved in cases where the court elected to award statutory dam-
ages to the exclusion of those dealing with the principles govern-
ing the determination of the extent of actual injury.
20. (C. C. D. Minn. 1912) 192 Fed. 67, aff'd (C. C. A. 8, 1913) 204 Fed.
921, rehearing denied (C. C. A. 8, 1913) 205 Fed. 900.
21. The term "statutory damage provision" is used for convenience in
this discussion to designate that portion of 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 25 (b) fol-
lowing the words "or in lieu of actual damages and profits." Statutory
damages in other words are those awarded in lieu of actual damages.
22. Westerman v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1916) 249 U. S. 100.
23. No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co. v. Norris (C. C. A. 4, 1921) 277 Fed. 951.
24. Davilla v. Brunswick-Balke Collender Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 94 F.
(2d) 567.
25. Douglas v. Cunningham (1935) 294 U. S. 207, rev'g (C. C. A. 1,
1934) 72 F. (2d) 536.
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MINIMUM DAMAGES
The statute provides that "in lieu" of actual damages the court
"may in its discretion allow the amounts as hereinafter stated,
* * * and such damage shall in no other case 26 exceed the sum of
$5000 or be less than $250.1127 For some time it was highly con-
troverted whether this statute made granting less that the mini-
mum sum discretionary with the court. The phraseology alone
certainly does not afford an answer, and some conflict is indi-
cated by the decisions. A number of cases have held that the
court is enabled by the statute to award less than two hundred
and fifty dollars. Although it is now rather well established that
this view is fallacious, an investigation of those cases and their
respective holdings is in order.
In Woodward v. Lydicrd-Peterson Co.28 involving the copying
of a map-directory, fifty dollars' actual damage could be shown.
The court construed the statute to mean that the specified sums
were to be awarded only when it was manifest that substantial
damage had been sustained but the specific amount defied calcu-
lation. Since the amount of damage here was precisely shown,
the court felt that the maximum-minimum clause was inappli-
cable. The court in Mills v. Standc rd Music Roll Co.2D was unable
to see actual damage and therefore made only a nominal award
under the statute. The judge omitted to assign any reasons of
policy, precedent, or logic for his result. Although no actual
damages were shown, it has been said that, on the basis of in-
ferences reasonably deductible from the evidence, more than the
specified maximum damages might be granted.o It has been
maintained, by analogy, that if there were indications that less
than the minimum damages had been sustained, the court might
with justification go below that amount. Dicta abound which an-
nounce this view as the correct one.81
Since the decisive Westerman Case,82 however, there is impres-
26. The statute enumerates certain special situations to which other
minima and maxima apply.
27. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 25 (b).
28. (C. C. D. Minn. 1912) 192 Fed. 67, aff'd (C. C. A. 8, 1913) 204 Fed.
921, rehearing denied (C. C. A. 8, 1913) 205 Fed. 900.
29. (D. C. D. N. J. 1915) 223 Fed. 849. See also Atlantic Monthly Co. v.
Post Publishing Co. (D. C. D. Mass. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 556.
30. Turner & Dahnken v. Crowley (C. C. A. 9, 1918) 252 Fed. 749.
31. Alfred Decker Cohn Co. v. Etchison Nat. Co. (D. C. E. D. Va. 1915)
225 Fed. 135; Turner & Dahnken v. Crowley (C. C. A. 9, 1918) 252 Fed.
748; 13 C. J., Copyright Law and Literary Property (1917) 1179, sec. 261;
Caldwell, The Copyright Problems of Broadcasters (1932) 2 J. Radio L. 287,
296.
32. Westerman Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1916) 249 U. S. 100.
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sive authority for the proposition that the decisions just noted
are erroneous, and that the statute absolutely prohibits the court
from exercising any discretion below the statutory minimum
where actual infringement can be shown. This line of cases pro-
ceeds on various theories, which merit examination severally.
Legislative intent and purpose. Congress embodied maximum-
minimum clauses in earlier copyright laws.3 3 The statute which
the present law succeeded provided that " * * * the sum to be
recovered in any action under the provisions of this section shall
not be less than $100 nor more than $5,000."34 The leading case
construing this clause was Brady v. Daly,35 which held that the
minimum set out in the statute was irreducible. The Court recog-
nized that the minimum clause was inserted because of the in-
herent difficulty of proving by satisfactory evidence precisely
what amount of damage has been sustained, and felt that the
statute was meant to provide a remedy for a special type of
wrong the existence of which may be established although its
measure of damages is speculative.
The Supreme Court has consistently striven thus to ascertain
the legislative purpose behind the provision for statutory dam-
ages. The Westerman case16 looked to the fact that the Con-
gressional committee reports37 concerning the statute while in
the embryo stage indicated that Congress took cognizance of the
interpretation 38 which had been put on the previous statute and
desired the law of the subject to remain unaltered. There has
been pointed out subsequently by the Court that the legislature
in supplying to the courts the statutory damage device bestowed
on copyright owners an alternative remedy when an accounting
would be inadequate because of the strictness of the rules of evi-
dence relating thereto 9 Naturally such remedy would be quite
unavailing if the court were permitted to disregard the minimum
sum set out. Prior legislative treatment of copyright infringe-
ment had been penal in nature, and therefore the courts had
construed the law strictly. Congress here was attempting to
33. (1856) 11 Stat. 138; (1870) 16 Stat. 214; (1895) 28 Stat. 965.
34. (1895) 28 Stat. 965. The language of the present statute is not in
itself decisive of this issue. It is, therefore, justifiable to look to the pre-
ceding law to determine matters of construction notwithstanding some dif-
ferences in phraseology.
35. (1899) 175 U. S. 148.
36. Westerman Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1916) 249 U. S. 100.
37. (1908) H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.; (1908) Sen. Rep.
No. 3854, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.
38. In Brady v. Daly (1899) 175 U. S. 148, cited supra, note 35.
39. Douglas v. Cunningham (1935) 294 U. S. 207, rev'g (C. C. A. 1,
1934) 72 F. (2d) 536.
1939J NOTES
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avoid this rigidity of construction by entrusting the award of
damages to the discretion of the trial judge subject to the above
noted qualifications, and so it was found by the Court.
Interpretation of the words. The courts have also achieved the
desired result on the basis of interpretation of the phraseology.
Once again a solution is proffered by the important Westerman
case.40 The Court there declared that obviously the mere use of
the phrase "in lieu of actual damages" negatived the possibility
that ascertained damages were contemplated. Something else is
clearly intended, i. e., such award as seems fair and just to the
court within specified bounds which are absolute.
Numerous cases have deemed a mere citation of the Westerman
case sufficient in declaring the statutory minimum mandatory on
the court.41 This is true even where the plaintiff has offered to
settle for less. 4
2
THE GENERAL "IN LIEU" DAMAGE CLAUSE VS.
SPECIFIC ALLOTMENTS
The statute after providing for fair and just damages directs
the court that it may award:
* * * in lieu of actual damages and profits such damages
as to the court shall appear to be just * * * and such damages
shall in no other case exceed the sum of $5,000 nor be less
40. Westerman Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1916) 249 U. S. 100. It is
clear that the only reason that a court might feel inclined to disregard the
statutory minimum would be the nonexistence of damages of $250.
41. Mail and Express Co. v. Life Pub. Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1912) 192 Fed.
899; S. E. Hendricks Co. v. Thomas Pub. Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1917) 242 Fed.
37; Saner v. Detroit Times Co. (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1917) 247 Fed. 687;
Waterson v. Tollefson (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1918) 253 Fed. 859; No-Leak-O
Piston Ring Co. v. Norris (C. C. A. 4, 1921) 277 Fed. 951; Wells v. Amer-
ican Bureau of Engineering (C. C. A. 7, 1922) 285 Fed. 371; Fisher v. Dill-
ingham (D. C. E. D. S. C. 1924) 298 Fed. 145; Cravens v. Retail Credit
Men's Ass'n (D. C. M. D. Tenn. 1924) 26 F. (2d) 833; M. Witmark & Sons
v. Calloway (D. C. E. D. Tenn. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 412; Buck v. Milam (D. C.
D. Idaho 1929) 32 F. (2d) 622; Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co. (1931)
283 U. S. 202, aff'g (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 266; Buck v. Bilkle
(C. C. A. 9, 1933) 63 F. (2d) 447; Sebring Pottery Co. v. Steubenville
Pottery Co. (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1934) 9 F. Supp. 384; Doll v. Libin (D. C.
D. Mont. 1936) 17 F. Supp. 546; Society of European Stage Authors and
Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1937)
19 F. Supp. 1; Hartfield v. Peterson (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 998;
Lerner, Copyright Law and Its Sanctions (1938) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 523;
Johnson, Pecuniary Liability of an Infringer of Statutory Copyright to the
Copyright Owner (1938) 4 John Marshall L. Q. 40; Caplan, The Measure
of Recovery in Actions for the Infringement of Copyright (1939) 37 Mich.
L. Rev. 564; Pforzheimer, Copyright Reform and the Duffy Bill (1938)
47 Yale L. J. 433.
42. Doll v. Libin (D. C. D. Mont. 1936) 17 F. Supp. 546.
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than the sum of $250 and shall not be regarded as a pen-
alty. * * *
First. In the case of a painting, statue, or sculpture, $10
for every infringing copy made or sold by or found in the
possession of the infringer or his agents or employees ;43
Comparable clauses for other types of creations follow.
The possibility for controversy regarding the applicability of
the general section to cases also covered by specific reference is
patent. The now established rule is that it is mandatory on the
court to follow the general clause whether or not the item in-
volved is specifically provided for." A survey of the decisions
leading to this result will reveal perhaps the most consequential
legal and practical problems relating to the stabilization of the
position of several classes of copyright owners, particularly song-
writers. Here was determined the cost of invading the citadel
of protection set up by the copyright laws.
Once more we must resort to the Westerman case.45 There the
infringement was of a pictorial illustration which would ostensi-
bly, at least, seem to be governed by the second paragraph of
Section 25(b).46 The court held, however, that although the
assessment of "in lieu" damages was discretionary, it was obli-
gatory that, if they were given, the general maximum-minimum
clause be observed. No direct cognizance was taken of the con-
flict which exists where a creation is both specifically provided
for and covered by the general clause. In giving such obligatory
force to the maximum-minimum clause, however, the case passes
inferentially on that issue.47
43. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 25 (b).
44. Westerman Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1916) 249 U. S. 100; Gross
v. Van Dyke Gravure Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1916) 230 Fed. 412; S. E. Hendricks
Co. v. Thomas Pub. Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1917) 242 Fed. 37; Saner v. Detroit
Times Co. (1917) 242 Fed. 687; M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement
Co. (D. C. E. D. S. C. 1924) 298 Fed. 470; Cravens v. Retail Credit Men's
Ass'n (D. C. M. D. Tenn. 1924) 26 F. (2d) 833; Buck v. Milam (D. C. D.
Idaho 1929) 32 F. (2d) 622; Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co. (1931) 283
U. S. 202 aff'g (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 236; Tiffany Produc-
tions v. Dewing (D. C. D. Md. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 911; Buck v. Bilkie (C. C.
A. 9, 1933) 63 F. (2d) 447.
45. (1916) 249 U. S. 100.
46. 17 U. S. C. A. see. 25 (b): "Second. In the case of any work enu-
merated in section 5 [which includes pictorial illustrations] of this title,
except a painting, statue, or sculpture, $1 for every infringing copy made
or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his agents or em-
ployees."
47. See also Waterson v. Tollefson (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1918) 253 Fed. 859;
M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co. (D. C. E. D. S. C. 1924)
298 Fed. 470; Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co. (1931) 283 U. S. 202,
aff'g (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 366.
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Direct holdings supporting the previously mentioned rule soon
followed. Waterson, Berlin, & Snyder Co. v. Tollefson"8 held
that in the light of the position taken in the Westerman case,
the history of comparable legislative enactments, and the pur-
pose and phraseology of the present statute, the minimum dam-
age for the violation of a musical copyright (also evaluated at
$10 per infringement by Subdivision Fourth) is $250. It has
been established, therefore, that the subdivisions covering spe-
cific items are to be inoperative until the general minimum is
complied with.49 There is general agreement that as long as the
$250 requisite is met, the schedule set out in the statute may
serve as a criterion in the assessment of damages, i. e., the
schedule is a standard suggested by Congress which may at the
court's option be used as the basis for the exercise of its discre-
tion.50
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.51 has clarified the issue, con-
clusively settling any dispute that might arise because of uncer-
tainty or ambiguity under the earlier decisions. The question
concerned a musical composition, and the issue was the respective
applicability of the general clause and the specific provisions.
The defendant sought to show by analogy to the penal provisions
of earlier statutes that the offences specifically covered by the
act were not meant to be included under the general section. The
Supreme Court rejected this contention, on the ground that there
is no manifestation of a legislative intent to exclude the infringe-
ments enumerated in the minor subdivisions from the operation
of the general clause. The reasonableness of such construction
becomes apparent when one considers that practically every case
that arises is covered by some subdivision, 52 and that, if these
are outside the scope of the general section, the whole purpose
of the statute would be defeated because of narrowness of appli-
cation.
48. (C. C. A. 4, 1921) 277 Fed. 951.
49. See cases cited supra, note 41.
50. See M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co. (D. C. E. D. S.
C. 1924) 298 Fed. 470, and cases cited supra, note 30; Admur, Coright
Law and Practice (1936) 1133; 13 C. J., Copyrights and Literary Property(1917) 1179, see. 261; Johnson, Pecuniary Liability of an Infringer of
Statutory Copyright to the Copyright Owner (1938) 4 John Marshall L. Q.
40.
51. (1931) 283 U. S. 202; See also Sprague, Copyright-Radio and the
Jewell-La Salle Case (1932) 3 Air L. Rev. 417.
52. These subdivisions cover the following: paintings, statues, sculptures,
periodicals, lectures, sermons, addresses, dramatic or dramatco-musical com-
positions, musical compositions, maps, works of art or reproductions thereof,
drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character, photographs,
prints and pictorial illustrations, motion picture photoplays, and other mo-
tion pictures. See (1927) 17 U. S. C. A. sees. 5, 25 (b).
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Ordinarily, however, the court is not compelled to follow this
schedule of specific items;53 indeed too close adherence to its
terms might lead to the occasionally asserted objection that the
court had blindly followed the stipulated allowance as a substi-
tute for the required exercise of its discretion.5
Irving Berlin v. Daigle,55 because of its pragmatic importance,
merits a rather detailed discussion. The infringement, occurring
at a rural dance hall, involved a rather facetious tune, "What Do
I Care, What Do I Care, My Sweetie Turned Me Down." The
lower court upheld defendant's contention that a jazz syncopated
song, such as that involved, was of insufficient dignity and pres-
tige to achieve more than the status of the nondescript class con-
templated by Paragraph Fourth, hence the general maximum-
minimum clause was inapplicable.5 6 The appellate court reversed,
holding the Westerman case to be controlling. A survey of the
contemporary scene suggests that affirmance would have created
chaos among popular song writers and would have jeopardized
the continued composition of the light musical songs which pro-
vide daily diversion for the masses of American people. The
widespread use of phonograph records, transcriptions, and the
radio has shortened tremendously the life of popular ditties and
has thereby made their production less lucrative.57 A composer
would hardly be warranted in pursuing his trade if the humble-
ness of his work would deprive it of all protection other than
that which Subdivision Fourth provides.
DISCRETION OF THE COURT
By the terms of the statute, the amount of damages under the
"in lieu" clause is discretionary with the trial court. The Wester-
man case" is authority for the rule that within the maximum-
minimum amounts set out, the court's discretion and sense of
justice are absolutely controlling and are not to be subjected to
review by an appellate court,5 9 although an exception has been
53. See cases cited supra, note 41; Admur, Copyright Law and Practice
(1936) 1133; 13 C. J., Copyrights and Literary Property (1917) 1179, sec.
261.
54. See Campbell v. Wireback (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 269 Fed. 372.
55. (C. C. A. 5, 1929) 31 F. (2d) 832.
56. (D. C. E. D. La. 1928) 26 F. (2d) 149.
57. See Pforzheimer, Copyright Reform and the Duffy Bill (1938) 47
Yale L. J. 433.
58. (1916) 249 U. S. 100.
59. See also No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co. v. Norris (C. C. A. 4, 1921)
277 Fed. 951; Cravens v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n (D. C. M. D. Tenn.
1924) 26 F. (2d) 833; Admur, Copyright Law and Practice (1936) 1137.
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drawn where a clear abuse of discretion is presented.00 Douglas
v. Cunningham61 distinctly pointed out that the whole purpose of
the statute, i. e., alleviation of the rigors of a strict construction,
requires this broad discretion on the part of the trial judge. As
has been pointed out above, there are dicta to the effect that
should the court by such inferences as are reasonably deducible
from the whole case gather that more than the $5,000 maximum
should be granted, then that sum may be exceeded. 2 It is be-
lieved that the principles which lead to the conclusion that no
less than the minimum amount may be awarded should, by
analogy, militate against that contention.
The court's discretion is ample to permit disregarding of the
suggested schedule as to specific items set out in the statute.2
This is, as has already been observed, only a set of standards
which the court may utilize or disregard as it chooses.
CampbelZ v. Wireback, 4 one of the most significant cases in this
field, merits a somewhat detailed consideration. Four thousand
infringing copies of a book were printed. The suggested award
in the statute was $1 a copy, and the trial court allowed $4,000
damages. The appeal was founded on the objection that the
court below had not exercised its discretion, but had mechani-
cally followed the statutory schedule. The appellate court pro-
pounded two important doctrines: first, that it was mandatory
that discretion be exercised; second, that a presumption of such
exercise exists and controls the result unless a direct abuse can
be shown. This case seems to qualify the hitherto asserted un-
impeachability of the trial court's decree. 5
A fairly extensive list of permissible factors relevant to the
determination of the proper damages may be enumerated. The
Wester an case 6 declared that the salient factors were the na-
ture of the copyright and the circumstances of the infringement.
Other cases have appended such considerations as an estimate of
lost profits6 7 and the dictates of justice as to the inconvenience
caused to the plaintiff by the infringement.8 Courts have tended
60. Campbell v. Wireback (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 269 Fed. 372.
61. (1935) 294 U. S. 207.
62. Turner & Dahnken v. Crowley (C. C. A. 9, 1918) 252 Fed. 749, cited
supra, note 30.
63. See authorities cited supra, notes 41, 53.
64. (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 269 Fed. 372.
65. See authorities cited supra, note 59.
66. (1916) 249 U. S. 100.
67. Gross v. Van Dyke Gravure Co. (C. C. A. 2 1916) 230 Fed. 412.
68. Warren v. White & Wyckoff Mfg. Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1930) 39 F.(2d) 922.
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to award greater damages where the infringement was mani-
festly intentional.69
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Section 40 of the copyright statutes provides:
In all actions, suits, or proceedings under this title, except
when brought by or against the United States or any officer
thereof, full costs shall be allowed, and the court may award
to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs.70
Superficially, the matter of attorney's fees might seem rather
unimportant. The announced rules relating thereto may be rather
briefly summarized. It is obligatory on the courts by the letter
of the statute to permit the discretion of the trial judge to pre-
vail ;71 but no case denies that the reasonableness of its exercise
is open to review on appeal.7 2 Direct holdings, as well as numer-
ous dicta, have established that the court is free to award no
attorney's fee if it sees fit.73 Numerous considerations have been
held proper as bases for ascertaining attorney's fees. It has been
held correct, for instance, for the trial judge to look to his own
professional experience and knowledge in deciding what fee
should be charged.7 4 Permissible factors which tend to the dimi-
nution of the attorney's fees are ordinarily: absence of actual
damages ;75 cessation by the defendant of the infringing conduct
as soon as objection thereto was made ;76 little work on the part
of counsel; unimportance of the case ;77 and partial acquiesence
of the plaintiff in the infringement.78 Courts have been prone to
award higher fees in instances: where the defendant had made
69. See e. g., Warren v. White & Wyckoff Mfg. Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y.
1930) 39 F. (2d) 922.
70. (1909) 35 Stat. 1084, (1927) 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 40.
71. Haas v. Leo Fiest (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1916) 234 Fed. 105; Marks v.
Leo Fiest (C. C. A. 2, 1923) 290 Fed. 959; Buck v. Bilkie (C. C. A. 9, 1933)
63 F. (2d) 447; Hartfield v. Peterson (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 998.
72. See Hendricks Co. v. Thomas Pub. Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1917) 242 Fed.
37; M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co. (D. C. S. D. S. C.
1924) 298 Fed. 470. The cases have uniformly maintained that the lower
court's award is reviewable.
73. Haas v. Leo Fiest (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1916) 234 Fed. 105; M. Witmark
& Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co. (D. C. S. D. S. C. 1924) 298 Fed. 470;
Campbell v. Wireback (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 269 Fed. 372; Buck v. Bilkie
(C. C. A. 9, 1933) 63 F. (2d) 447.
74. Marks v. Leo Fiest (C. C. A. 2, 1923) 290 Fed. 959.
75. Fisher v. Dillingham (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1924) 298 Fed. 145.
76. Buck v. Bilkie (C. C. A. 9, 1933) 63 F. (2d) 447.
77. Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman (C. C. A. 2, 1914) 218 Fed.
577.
78. Haas v. Leo Fiest, Inc. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1916) 243 Fed. 105.
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extensive sales of the infringing product ;71 where the plaintiff's
counsel did an exceptional amount of work ;8o where the fee which
defendant's attorney had contemplated exacting of defendant if
he were successful was high ;81 were the case was of extreme
importance ;82 where the defense which plaintiff's attorney en-
countered throughout the trial was rigorous ;83 and where the
infringement was deliberate.14
It is submitted, however, that the matter of attorney's fees is
of more significance than casual observation would reveal. Seem-
ingly, in spite of declarations that such is not the practice,
awards of attorney's fees have been made a mode of circum-
venting the statute. An examination of certain cases would indi-
cate that such a conclusion is not unwarranted.8 A defense at-
torney's attention to this matter may materially affect the cash
amount which his client may have to pay.
Occasionally the award of a low fee or of none at all appears
as a device for reducing the substantial value of the recovery,
to give effect to weaknesses apprehended by the court in the com-
plainant's position. This may be done indirectly as in Campbell
v. Wireback,"6 where the controversy centered about an alleged
abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court. The salient
consideration in the appellate court's decision that such abuse
did not exist and that the allotted amount was not exorbitant was
the fact that no counsel fees had been granted.
Again, the award of fees may be more frankly and directly
utilized as a compensating mechanism, as in Cravens v. Retail
Credit Men's Association,87 where the court, believing that only
nominal damages had been sustained, made the statutory award
reluctantly and granted a negligible attorney's fee, admittedly
79. Hartfield v. Peterson (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 998.
80. M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co. (D. C. S. D. S. C.
1924) 298 Fed. 470.
81. Hartfield v. Peterson (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 998.
82. Marks v. Leo Fiest, Inc. (C. C. A. 2, 1923) 290 Fed. 959; Witmark
v. Calloway (D. C. E. D. Tenn., 1927) 22 F. (2d) 412.
83. M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co. (D. C. S. D. S. C.
1924) 298 Fed. 470.
84. Warren v. White & Wyckoff Mfg. Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1930) 39
F. (2d) 923.
85. Witmark v. Calloway (D. C. E. D. Tenn. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 412;
Lerner, Copyright Law and Its Sanctions (1938) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 523;
Johnson, Pecuniary Liability of an Infringer of Statutory Copyright to the
Copyright Owner (1938) 4 John Marshall L. Q. 40; Caplan, The Measure
of Recovery in Actions for the Infringement of Copyright (1939) 37 Mich.
L. Rev. 564.
86. (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 269 Fed. 372.
87. (D. C. M. D. Tenn. 1924) 26 F. (2d) 833.
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because of the above mentioned situation; or as in Haas v. Leo
Fiest, Inc.,;8 which is authority for the proposition that the court
will deny any award of attorney's fees where plaintiff ostensibly
acquiesced in the infringement and did not object until defendant
had spent considerable money in publicizing his product, the
court apparently using attorney's fees as a vehicle for effecting
a quasi-estoppel.
Similar instances of using denial of attorney's fees as a means
for escaping the consequences of the statutory minimum may be
adduced. Thus, in Fred Fischer, Inc., v. Dillingham,-9 there was
only a nominal infringement. The judge condemned the contro-
versy as a "trivial pother" and declared the plaintiff's case com-
pletely without merit. Being bound with respect to the $250
minimum, he nevertheless disallowed any counsel fee. Inasmuch
as the case went through several stages of trial and considerable
legal work had been required, it is clear that the plaintiff actu-
ally received only a fraction of the minimum allowance. So, in
Buck v. Bilkie9' fees were entirely denied because the defendant
had obligingly ceased the infringement on the first notice, and
the court was unwilling to grant any more than the minimum
absolutely required by the statute.
On the other hand, where plaintiff sustained no actual dam-
ages but the infringement was deliberate, relatively high attor-
ney's fees have been awarded ;91 and, where both wilful and inno-
cent infringers were joined in a single action, fees were granted
only against the former class.92 A generous allowance was made,
also, where defendant vigorously contested the case when he had
knowledge at all times that plaintiff's right to recover was very
clear, except possibly for an accidental omission of filing.13
The professions and the practice of the courts seem here to be
at variance. The courts tend to disallow attorney's fees as a
means of alleviating the harshness and rigor of the absolute mini-
mum award and of estopping or punishing a plaintiff who is so
situated that he seems undeserving of even $250. Conversely
high attorney's fees have been used almost as a penal measure
against deliberate infringers or those who have contested what
was admittedly a clear case of infringement. Although in certain
88. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1916) 234 Fed. 105.
89. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1924) 298 Fed. 145.
90. (C. C. A. 9. 1933) 63 F. (2d) 447.
91. Warren v. White & Wyckoff Mfg. Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1930) 39
F. (2d) 923.
92. Gross v. Van Dyke Gravure Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1916) 230 Fed. 412.
93. Strauss v. Penn. Printing and Publishing Co. (D. C. E. D. Penn.
1915) 220 Fed. 977.
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specific instances justice may be furthered by such practices, it
is submitted that they transgress directly the spirit of the statute
and thereby render it less effective in protecting the interests
Congress had in mind when the statute was drafted.
CONCLUSION
Criticism and suggestions have been embodied in the various
sections of this analysis. An attempt now will be made only to
state in broad terms the rules which the courts have applied in
awarding or refusing statutory damages. in proceeding under
the "in lieu" clause, the court must adhere to the general maxi-
mum-minimum clause; it may, if it chooses, follow the sums
stipulated in the subdivisions. Election as between actual and
statutory damages depends on the court's conception of the exi-
gencies of the particular case. The discretion of the trial judge
as it is exercised in the proper allocation of statutory damages
is normally not subject to review. Attorney's fees are discretion-
ary with the trial judge but frequently are used as a mode of
circumventing the statute or penalizing a particularly flagrant
offender.
Proposals for reduction of the $250 minimum have been fairly
numerous. It is the contention of the broadcasting interests that
the minimum fixed is unjust and unreasonable as applied to
radio.94 Those who advocate this view have submitted persuasive
arguments. From such quarters comes the suggestion that a
more realistic and workable minimum would be ten dollars.r
Proposals recently before Congress0 ' contemplate, in essence, rais-
94. Caldwell, The Copyright Problem of Broadcasters (1932) 2 J. Radio
L. 287, 296; Note (1926) 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549.
95. Caldwell, op cit. supra, note 94; Caldwell, A Suggested Model For a
Copyright Act (1932) 2 J. Radio L. 315, 326.
96. The following bills have recently been proposed: (a) The Duffy Bill(1936) Sen. Rep. No. 3047, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. This bill raises the statu-
tory maximum to $20,000 but practically abolishes the minimum, reference
to which is hazy. The plaintiff's case would be more difficult of proof and
barren of substantial recovery. (b) The Sirovich proposal (1936) H. R.
Rep. No. 11,420, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. This bill would raise the statutory
maximum to $20,000 and retain the $250 minimum except as to musical
compositions "not a component part of a copyrighted motion picture or
dramatico-musical composition." The latter would be subject to a $125 mini-
mum. (c) The Vestal Bill (1931) H. R. Rep. No. 12, 549, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. In effect this bill would retain substantially the same awards as the
present law for wilful infringements. Where the infringement is involun-
tary, however, only an amount equivalent to a fair license fee, between $50
and $2000, would be allowed.
For an excellent summary of these proposals and others, see Caplan, The
Measure of Recovery in Actions for the Infringement of Copyright (1939)
37 Mich. L. Rev. 564; Solberg, The Present Copyright Situation (1932) 40
Yale L. J. 184; Note (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 477; Pforzheimer, Copyright
Reform and the Duffy Bill (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 433.
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ing the maximum award and drastically reducing the minimum.
It is clear, however, that copyright owners, as outlined earlier,
must look to some statutory minimum damages as their salva-
tion. Proceeding from this major premise, it is defensible, in-
deed to maintain that $250 is a workable minimum, and a rea-
sonable compromise of the conflicting claims involved, especially
inasmuch as it represents the result of pressure applied by
opposing groups over a long period. The maintenance of the
present minimum is warranted, also, by the intangible nature of
copyrights, the type of organization to which the artists have
been forced to resort, and the interest of the public in the con-
tinued production of musical compositions which might be con-
siderably impaired should the encouragement offered by the pres-
ent statutory award be removed.
CARRoLL J. DONOHUE.
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